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BRITAIN AND FRANCE BETWEEN Two VARS: CONFLICTING STRATEGIES OF
PEACE SINCE VERSAILLES. By Arnold Wolfers. New York: Harcourt,
Brace & Co., 1940. Pp. 467. $3.75.
THE QUEST FOR PEACE SINCE THE WORLD WAR. By William E. Rappard.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940. Pp. 516. $4.00.
THESE books belong among the dismal chronicles of peoples who have lost
alike their minds, their souls and their future. They both deal with the failure
of the Western democracies to save themselves by organizing the enforcement
of law and order in the community of nations. Precisely why the peoples of
the West, with wealth, power and all the promise of the world at their call,
should have courted suicide in the 1930's is a problem simple on the surface
and as baffling below the surface as the problem of the "causes" of the fall
of ancient Rome.
Professor Wolfers of the Yale Institute of International Studies seeks to
grapple with it, not without success, by reviewing the foreign policies of
France and Britain from Versailles to a terminal point which is somewhat
lost in his mingling of a chronological with a topical treatment. His work
is less a history of Anglo-French diplomacy than an analysis of the emergence,
application and breakdown of the principal concepts which shaped the behavior
of the men of Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay: "Sccurite," Eastern
alliances, "L'Organisation de la Paix" and disarmament, balance of power,
appeasement. Wolfers' analyses are lucid and suggestive. His book is well
documented and contains an admirable bibliography. If the reader at the end
still has no clear answer to the initial question, the fault lies less with Dr.
Wolfers than with the confusions and contradictions in which the British and
French leaders involved themselves in the years of surrender and rout.
One might wish, however, fliat the author had striven somewhat harder
for sharpness and incisiveness and that he had given more attention to the
details of crucial decisions and to the internal determinants of external action.
He somehow misses the point of the British election of 1935, of the Maffey
report (which is relegated to a footnote), of the bargain, not mentioned at
all, between Hoare and Laval in September, 1935, to betray Ethiopia and
the Covenant, of Carpatho-Ukraine, of the Cagoulard conspiracy and the
Non-Intervention Committee and the logic of the Munichmen and the secret
fears which lay behind the belated abandonment of appeasement and final
catastrophe.
The problem posed for solution by M. Rappard, gracious and learned
Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies and Professor at
the University of Geneva, is at once simpler and more fundamental than that
dealt with in Wolfers' book. His chapters, originally written in preparation
for a series of lectures at Harvard, deal with "Peace as a War Aim" (1914-
1918), "The Quest for Peace" at Paris, the development of international
arbitration and adjudication in the two decades after Versailles, "The Fluctu-
ating Destinies of Collective Security," and the failure of disarmament. His
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theme, brilliantly and beautifully presented, is that peace failed because the
peoples and governments of the democracies were unwilling to assume the
responsibilities and risks of enforcing it by collective action against peace-
breakers. He properly puts American guilt first: "If the United States had
failed to intervene in Europe in 1917, the peace settlement would doubtless
have been far less just. But it might well have been less precarious. Or if
the United States had consented, after 1920, to defend the liberal conquests
it fought to secure on the fields of battle and at the conference table, then,
but only then, would the peace settlement have been both just and lasting."
He perceives with considerable clarity the hypocrisies and betrayals of the
democratic statesmen who ultimately doomed their world to disaster. "The
present plight of Europe is due less to the excessive ambitions of the men of
1919 than to the excessive debility of their successors. It would be fair to
lay the blame on the former only if they could be made responsible for not
foreseeing the feebleness of the latter." And the consequences of feebleness?
• . . "Where, except on the hidden tables of our innermost hopes, is it written
that freedom will not after all perish from the earth ?"
To this question there is no answer. Rappard sees hope in federalism, but
knows that a self-defeated generation has neither vision nor courage to act.
These qualities, always the sine qua non of success in any human enterprise
which is novel and dangerous, are the monopoly of the new Caesars and
their disciples. The peoples of the West are lost-already conquered or ripe
for conquest, because they have rejected the dangers of solidarity and pre-
ferred the illusions of security through passive inaction or' through "national
defense" which is neither defense nor national but only a feckless striving
toward goals forever unattainable on the part of those too timid or blind to
understand the world. Tomorrow belongs to the conquerors. The peace-
seekers are dead or dying. These two sad books will deserve honorable
mention when the last epitaph comes to be written.
FREDERICK L. SCHUMANt
ADMINISTRATIvE LAW-CASES AND COMMENTS. By Walter Gellhorn. Chi-
cago: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1940. Pp. lxxii, 1007. $6.00.
AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. By James Hart. New York:
F. S. Crofts & Co., 1940. Pp. xviii, 621. $5.00.
LAWYERS who deal with the administrative activities of any government
fall into two classes: those who work for government and those who do not.
Law schools are engaged in training both kinds. The cases that are the chief
training tools grow out of disputes between these two types of lawyers that
were carried to the judiciary for settlement. The disputes are now dead and
buried, yet the opinions of the judges live on as part of the apparatus which
our two kinds of lawyers will use when they go forth to combat in the future.
But they are only a small part of that apparatus. For the rest, the lawyer
t Professor of Political Science, Williams College.
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who works for government will soon become a specialist in his field. He will
live with it and with nothing else and his techniques will be shaped by the
work to be done. The lawyer on the other side is not nearly so likely to be
a specialist. The administrative matter in which he finds himself may be
something novel and forbidding, or it may be old stuff to him too. His task
will usually be twofold: to keep his client out of the administrative waters
entirely, if that is possible, and then, if the plunge cannot be avoided, to keep
clear of the rocks and shoals of "bureaucracy" and bring his client to shore
as safely as possible; or to try to get what his client wants or must have
from. government. His techniques as pilot will range all over the lot. For
both kinds of lawyers, however, the stuff that is gleaned from casebook and
classroom is but a background for the concreteness of the particulars that
make up the working days of both.
It is some such notion as this that has moved recent editors of casebooks
in this field to bring administrative law down from the lofty heights of con-
stitutional law on which Frankfurter and Davison deposited it with their
1932 casebook and, instead, to focus materials on the administrative process
at work. The three books that appeared in 1937 and 1938 all did this' and
now, in 1940, Professor Gellhorn carries on the same approach. His Intro-
duction tells us that he will not take up "the substantive law that is projected
by the administrative agencies" or "in detail the procedure of each of the
myriad agencies." The objective of the book is said to be "to exhibit problems
that may be regarded as generally applicable to administrative functioning,"
and that doubtless is as far as a book of this sort may go.
In spite of the stated objective the book starts off with two long chapters
on separation of powers and delegation of powers. Together they take up
about three hundred pages, or nearly a third of the book. They raise the
legal questions involved in "a valid transference of power from the legislature
to an administrative agency." These might well have been cut down. It is
hard to believe that ten pages of cases on the power of legislatures to grant
divorces, twelve pages on declaratory judgments and advisory opinions, or
eight pages on the reviewability of decisions of the Court of Claims add very
much toward the attainment of the objective. The chapter on delegation of
power runs along for one hundred and seventy pages. That seems much
too long. The material is fine but if there is any place in the book that would
gain by cutting down on cases and putting text treatment to the forefront
it is here. There is plenty of excellent text, but why all the cases on top
of it for all these pages?
The emphasis on the administrative process at work is shown in the excel-
lent chapters that follow. They go through the right to notice in Chapter
IV, its adequacy in Chapter V, the elements that go to make up a fair hearing
in Chapters VI, VII and VIII and the necessity of findings in Chapter IX.
There is a lot of provocative and meaningful text matter mixed up with the
cases. In fact a more industrious fellow reviewer has figured out that non-
1. I refer, of course, to STASoN, THE LAW OF ADMtNIsr1 IAvE TEmUNALS (1937),
MTAURER, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON AD.iNXSTRA=IVE LAW (1937) and St.ns,
CASES AND MATERLS ON ADINmsrATIvE LAW (1938).
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case material takes up about 58 per cent of the total pages.2 And when this
editor writes his own text, he writes with an engaging flair. In a casebook,
that is something to point to with joy in the heart. Most of the text is made
up of sharp and imaginative comments, quips and queries that are sprinkled
liberally through the book, as well as pages of background material and
summaries of particular topics. For the rest he has chosen well from law
review notes and articles, two Supreme Court briefs and an argument, some
magazine articles and books, and a speech or two.
Chapter X, which deals with methods of obtaining judicial review, leaves
something to be desired. The notion of the exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies and the primary jurisdiction rule are passed off too briefly while the
problems raised by the newer statutory schemes for review are scarcely
touched upon. Brief paragraphs only are devoted to quo warranto and habeas
corpus, while certiorari and mandamus, by contrast, get extended treatment.
Chapter XI takes surprisingly few pages to cover the scope of judicial
review. In its fifty nine pages are found an excerpt from Henderson's book
on the Federal Trade Commission and six cases: the Ben Avon case, the
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. case, Acker v. United States, Ng Fung Ho v.
White, the Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co. case and Crowell v. Benson, plus
a few digested cases. An extended footnote on pages 893 and 894 asks enough
questions to keep anyone busy for a long time, but the materials do seem
skimpy. What about the Interstate Commerce Commission, postal orders,
public land matters, the Board of Tax Appeals and other tax cases, to say
nothing about some of the newer federal agencies? And what about some
state cases ? Exhaustive treatment is, no doubt, impossible within the con-
fines of a casebook, but a more complete sampling would do much to provide
more adequate materials for discussion.
The criticisms herein made are without benefit of teaching experience with
the book. Perhaps they will disappear when that time comes. In any event,
they must not serve to obscure my conviction that this is a brilliant book
and one that deserves high praise. But one omission bothers me a lot, and
that is material relating to res judicata as applied to administrative orders
and the integrity, or lack of it, of such orders against collateral attack. A
lawyer ought to be familiar with what little there is on these subjects. I am
sorry, too, that Professor Gellhorn has not seen fit to follow Professor Stason
in reproducing in full some statute creating an administrative agency. I have
found it to be an excellent teaching tool. After all, the powers of adminis-
trative agencies flow in some fashion from statutes, and the bits of statutes
that show up in the cases do not give an adequate picture of the ever present
questions of interpretation that beset every agency's work.
Professor Hart is, if anything, unduly modest about his book. He tells
us in the Preface that it is designed as "a general introduction to American
administrative law" for use in undergraduate courses. As such it is offered
as a successor to Goodnow's Principles of the Administrative Law of the
United States, first published in 1905. It is a worthy successor. It seems
to me that any undergraduate who has his nose well rubbed into this intro-
2. See Clark Byse's excellent review of this book in 25 IowA L. REv. 839 (1940).
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duction will have little left to rub it in when he turns up at law school and
is introduced to Professor Geliliorn's book. In fact he can tell Professor
Gellhorn's students a thing or two after they have reached the end of that
book. He can tell them about the law relating to the official relation (Chap-
ter I), de facto officers (Chapter II), quo warranto (Chapter III), incom-
patible and forbidden offices (Chapter IV), res judicata and collateral attack
(Chapter XV) and the contractual and criminal liabilities of officers (Chap-
ters XXIII and XXV). Otherwise the general coverage of topics is about
the same.
Professor Hart's method throughout the book is to write his own com-
ments on the cases. These often summarize the holding, tell whether the
case is "leading" or not, what it is supposed to illustrate, and sometimes
too whether it can be reconciled with other cases. Sometimes he pronounces
the decision "sound"; at other times he criticizes it. Often, too, there is a
summary of the subject involved in a group of cases and a statement of
questions still unanswered. In many instances he has summarized law review
articles and discussion from other sources. Take this sort of material along
with the excerpts from opinions and you get a running story that represents
an excellent attempt to combine the technique of a casebook with that of a
textbook. Doubtless this plan was adopted for the use of undergraduates who
are supposed to be untutored in the mysteries of the case and the case system.
This same approach is reflected in Professor Hart's effort in Part II to
set up two schemes for classifying the materials that make up Part III on
the scope and limits of administrative powers and Part V on the availability
of different kinds of remedies. My trouble with these schemes is that they
are set apart in separate chapters from the materials which they are sup-
posed to classify. I ran into difficulties as soon as I tried to put the materials
into the cubbyholes and couldn't help but wonder what was to be gained even
if I should succeed. Professor Hart has no illusions about his schemes and
gives due warning that no sharp lines are intended to be drawn, for "sharp
exactness is illusory." It seems to me that a good deal of bewilderment will
be the reward of the student who tries hard to make the schemes work. It
would seem like a waste of time to me.
One thing that irritated me about the book was the size of the type. The
excerpts from court opinions are in type that is a trifle smaller than that used
throughout Professor Gellhorn's book but for some reason the extensive text
material is printed in even smaller type. It is but little larger than that nor-
mally used for footnotes in law reviews. Of course it cut down the total
number of pages and doubtless saved some dollars but those seem to be small
matters, particularly when the book is to be used as a student text.
BREcK P. McALLISTERt
tProfessor of Law, University of Washington.
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A LIBERAL IN WARTIME: THE EDUCATION OF ALBERT DE SILVER. By
Walter Nelles.1 Edited by Lewis Gannett. New York: W. W. Norton &
Co., Inc., 1940. Pp. 221.
IT is dramatic that the epitaph of the National Civil Liberties Bureau, if
not of its successor, the American Civil Liberties Union, should take the
form of a biography of one of its founders lovingly written by another, both
now tragically dead. The circumstances lend a sentimental atmosphere to
the story-a feeling of nostalgia for a time more distant than the years
between denote. And it was no small part of Walter Nelles' wisdom that
this book reads more like history than the statement of a faith as true for
now as then. He stood with Sumner in the perception that morals and beliefs
are creatures of a given time and place. The problem must give rise to the
solution; the solution must not be permitted to mould the problem. In writing
the present story, he embodied this perception. The bases of the credo of
those who launched the National Civil Liberties Bureau are revealed-bases
which were founded, as Nelles knew, on an arrested moment in the flux of
time. To say that the credo is no longer at grips with the issues before us
here and now is simply to say that the moment has passed. It is not un-
comforting to those of us who believed in this -credo that both Albert De Silver,
the subject of this book, and Walter Nelles himself, ceased active work in
the American Civil Liberties Union as the present moment first began to
appear.
Albert De Silver was the archetype of what the National Civil Liberties
Bureau stood for. Conservative in political and economic outlook, a Bones
man and heir to a comfortable fortune, he spent his time and money in the
defense, as Nelles put it, "of radicals of many shades, from red, through
pink to Christian blue." He took Voltaire's attitude toward the man with
whom he disagreed, not only as a rule of personal conduct but as a command
to public action. And since he did not agree with most of those whom he
defended, his devotion to freedom of speech was undefiled by a motive ulterior
to the struggle for it.
Those who have read Nelles' other writings will know the facility and
charm with which De Silver is revealed. By copious quotation and para-
phrase from the sparse letters available, there is brought to life a man of
abundant grace of mind, a hale and comfort-loving fellow whom everyone
would have liked to know, and yet a devotee of justice and of tolerance who
did not flinch when the finger of his mind pointed down the unpopular,
derided path.
The point of view which De Silver and his colleagues took bases upon
certain postulates. First, there must be a fundamental faith in the ability
of man to determine his social destiny by reason. Second, one must be certain
that the rational argument will, if heard, prevail. Third, there must be a
sense of absolute security that the processes of democracy if given free rein
cannot be made the instruments of their own destruction, come what may.
Each of these faiths De Silver was ready to affirm. "I feel sure as I do of
anything," he wrote while still in college, "that what changes will come in
my ways of thinking will be on the paths of beliefs based on exact reasoning
1. Late Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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and not on the return road of less enquiring faith. For to me the rationally
certain is far more beautiful, more efficient and more uplifting, than the
unenquiring faith as a basis of one's way of life." When the holocaust of
war had come and emotion overran the thinking of every man, he still stated
it as his ambition "to try to form part of the intellectual pivot upon which
the balance of our civilization must be gained-to reason my way to a position
before the fact and not after it." Billy Sunday made him sick. "Not a single
word that made the slightest rational appeal." Nothing which "a rational
being could recognize as a thought-words with no reason and fact after fact
with no relevance." Even La Follette's fustian offended him.
So devout a faith in reason demands that trade in ideas be subject to the
principle of laissez faire. Nelles states the theory thus :-"Intelligence is never
very widespread. Its 'principles,' or best guesses, count practically, when
at all, only as modified in the course of slow diffusion through gradually
increasing minorities. Their chance to count depends upon their freedom to
be heard, and that depends upon equal freedom for all principles, however
stupid or pernicious. Therefore, it seemed to us, Jefferson was right in
observing that 'it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil govern-
ment for its officers to interfere when principles break out in overt acts against
peace and good order.' Any narrower limit to lawful freedom of expres-
sion would endanger if not destroy what seemed to us the most valuable
achievement of the bloody centuries through which the ideal of freedom had
won acceptance as a commonplace." Hence, De Silver, with the other mem-
bers of the National Civil Liberties Bureau, disagreed with the substitution
in the Schenk and Debs cases of the test of "clear and present danger of
substantive evils" for "overt acts against peace and good order." Regardless
of the motive or the power of the speaker, words, if not actually put to
immediate action, must not be subject to government control. Even the
Ku Klux Mlan "should be left free to organize and disseminate their detest-
able propaganda." Reason would triumph in the end.
All this unquestionably is good doctrine. It warms the heart to remember
that not so long ago intelligent men could feel so sound a sense of political
security as to lead their lives and determine their actions as if such an ideal
were actually in sight. Of the many questionings reflected in this book con-
cerning theories, plans and tactics, not once did De Silver apparently question
that American democracy would survive the war. And just there, of course,
lies the difference between then and now. Three premises, I have said, under-
lay the philosophy De Silver embraced. With the first two, belief in reason
and in its triumph in a free and quiet market, perhaps we can agree-although
the questions today seem somewhat sophomoric. The third premise, how-
ever, and the cornerstone, is now removed. "Am I to believe," De Silver
could rhetorically exclaim, "that this country is so weak as to be vrecked
by any New Nationalism? or that any one man may become a dictator? It
makes me sore."
Current events have brought into a new and unforeseen perspective the
danger which De Silver so cavalierly tossed aside. To make liberty of
expression dependent on one's allegiances or political beliefs is to conflict
with the very bases of the theory to which the founders of the Union sub-
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scribed. But it would be a dull observer of recent history who did not per-
ceive that in a period of hysteria induced by stark danger from without, the
external enemy is aided by allowing his adherents within the walls to under-
mine the defenses by speech as well as act.
The dilemma is insoluble upon this statement of the case. But the difficulty
stems from the framing of the issue. In a period of actual danger to the
institutions upon which alone freedom of speech can be founded, the problem
is wrongly stated if put in terms of that freedom as an independent goal.
In such periods the problem shifts from concentration upon the ideal to a
struggle for the survival of its prerequisite conditions. Such a shift of em-
phasis is nothing new. A recent example is the interpretation of the Wagner
Act to restrict "freedom of speech" upon the part of industrial employers.
The right of labor freely to organize is a condition of the kind of healthy
economic process in which free speech can truly be said to exist. When that
right is threatened, the ideal must give way so that the more basic right may
be safely entrenched.
Freedom of speech is a symptom of a secure and prosperous political con-
dition, not its cause. When the security and prosperity are impaired, all effort
must be spent upon their restoration, even if the symptom is neglected. It
need not be feared that in approaching the problem thus, the good sought
to be protected will be lost. It is only common prudence that the goods
dependent on prosperity are less endangered by conscious temporary sacrifice
than by quixotic disregard of patent insecurity.
If this analysis be sound it is unlikely that in the present war liberals will
find their most satisfactory instrument in the American Civil Liberties Union.
The protection of the rights of labor and consumers and small business against
injuries not required by the common good, the safeguarding of religious and
racial minorities from hysterical oppression, will best be accomplished by
organizations devoted to those separate aims. The individual will have little
to fear of undue restrictions on his basic personal liberties if success is achieved
along these lines. In this defensive battle there is little to inspire enthusiasm,
for without the kind of freedom for which De Silver and Nelles fought, the
chances of human and social advance are indubitably lessened. But until we
can once more say with De Silver that the suggestion of this country suc-
cumbing to fascism "makes me sore," our fight must be defense.
Even in such a fight, however, it is important not to forget the battle which
lies ahead once security is restored; for to be complacent in a defensive victory
would be in the end to lose the prize. As a guide to future action, as a light
beyond the present blackout, this book serves a noble function. Its precepts
we must lay aside for the moment, but with reverence and hope that some
day we may turn to them again in a world in which they can prevail.
ALAN M. STROOCKt
Member of New York bar.
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CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW MERCHANT. By Philip Warren Thayer.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1939. Pp. xxvi, 1296.
LAW Merchant usually brings to mind that body of customs and laws which
were enforced in the Staple Courts of England and mercantile courts on the
continent and which became the predecessor of most of our European and
American commercial law, now happily codified by many statutes, uniform
and otherwise. The term is also frequently applied to those modern com-
mercial practices which form part of the international customs and dealings
of merchants. The title, as applied to this work, is really a misnomer. The
book is a collection of modem cases on the law of sales, of a unique and
possibly functional outline, with a small section on negotiable instruments
added to the material on documents of title which is usually found in the
standardized courses. Except for casual reference to a few law review articles,
the historical materials on the law merchant in which the author is so well
versed are entirely missing. The book contains not over fifty references to
case material prior to the Civil War and approximately one-half of this
number of reported cases before that time. The great majority of cases and
references are from decisions since World War I. The book, therefore, must
be evaluated as a tool for teaching a modern and practically standard course
in the law of sales.
The author has succeeded in collecting a mass of raw material for use
in this field. There are over eight hundred cases and statements or extracts
from cases, covering approximately one thousand pages, together with two
hundred pages of the complete text of American, English, German and French
statutes in the field of sales, international draft acts, and chamber of commerce
rules of uniform customs and practice for commercial documentary credit.
Approximately twenty pages are devoted to blank forms of various types
of shipping documents. Such notes as there are, usually are descriptions of
single cases. Critical notes attempting to compile and analyze materials
together with copious references to treatises, articles and law review material,
which are found in most modem case books, are entirely omitted. The col-
lection of materials on sales is similar to and covers the same material found
in the ordinary works on sales, but in a different order.
The work is most unusual in its addition of approximately one hundred
and seventy pages of unintegrated material on the types of negotiable instru-
ments which are often found in connection with sales transactions. In this
short space, the author attempts to give a bird's-eye picture of the field
of negotiable instruments. Inasmuch as the teaching material is made up
wholly of cases and extracts of cases, this section is too sketchy to supply
the needs of an experienced teacher in the field and is so spotty in choice
of materials that it is likely to confuse a beginner. In this section, as in the
whole book, few sign posts are offered to guide the teacher or student through
the mass of learning and writing available in the field, and practically no
warnings appear of pitfalls and variations of interpretation.
If the book is intended to be used in the much-heralded course in the
revised curriculum of the Harvard Law School which was going to com-
bine negotiable instruments and sales, its success must be set down as ex-
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tremely doubtful. The subject matter of this combined course is unique in
that it is mainly in a field in which the law has been codified. If there is
any unity to be found in the materials, it must be in the technique of inter-
preting statutes and codes. It is submitted that it is impossible to develop
such a technique by the use of the same crude tools which Langdell fashioned
for the purpose of studying and systematizing the common law. Especially
is this true when the cases are chosen at random from common law, civil
law and jurisdictions which are controlled by special statutes. Any systematic
attempt to develop law from such material is more likely to create in the
student's mind an impression which Jerome Frank has characterized as an
aphose.1 This difficulty is aggravated by the fact that much comparative
material has been thrown in by way of casual reference.
Mr. Thayer has done a great service in calling the attention of the pro-
fession to the necessity for considering comparative law in the form of
statutory enactments and various commercial customs, and he has taken the
first step in the direction of developing this material. It is unfortunate that
he did not see fit to break sharply with the traditional case method and to
create a course frankly based on developing a technique of statutory inter-
pretation.
FREDERIcK K. BEUTELt
INSTITUTES OF THE ROMAN LAW OF CIVIL PROcEDURE. Revised edition by
Leopold Wenger. Translated by Otis Harrison Fisk. New York: Oskar
Piest, 1940. Pp. xxix, 440.
THE development of an entirely rational system of civil procedure became
possible only after the common law forms of action had been abolished and
the merger of law and equity had taken place. Only recently have we been
able to regard our procedural system as a pliable medium for bringing about
a just application of substantive law by the courts. Roman jurists met a
comparable situation in the period in which the so-called extra ordinaria
cognitio had replaced the older formulary procedure and the merger of the
civil and pretorian law had taken place. This history of the Roman Law of Civil
Procedure therefore bears as much interest for the lawyer who wishes to profit
from another people's experience as for the historian. In Wenger's Institutes,
however, the common law practitioner will find far more than an account of
long passed events. He will be afforded an excellent introduction into the
conceptual technique with which civil lawyers tried to handle procedural
problems. German and Italian students of civil procedure doubtless indulged
in often useless conceptualism but they frequently succeeded in discovering
1. "The subjective sensation of shadow . . . The Langdellian teacher . . . deals
in aphoses; what he passes on to his students is a subjective sensation of the shadow
of the actualities of a lawyer's life." Frank, Address, "What's Wrong with the Law
Schools," September 15, 1938.
tProfessor of Jurisprudence, College of William and Mary School of Jurisprudence.
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certain real problems with which any procedural system must deal and in
expressing the possible solutions in different concepts: e.g., the problem of
the cooperation of court and parties, the conditions of declaratory relief, the
relevance of procedural mistakes, etc. A reading of Wenger's Institutes will
give one an acquaintance with these fundamental concepts which will be en-
hanced by the extremely useful German-English and English-German glossary
of those terms which Mr. Fisk has composed.
It seems scarcely necessary to emphasize the other merits of this revision
and its translation. Wenger's Institutes sum up all our present knowledge
on the subject of Roman Civil Procedure. Research of the past fourteen years
has added much to the content of the original edition, published in 1925. Mr.
Fisk has shown himself to be more than a skilful translator- he is an inter-
preter of the author's thoughts. VNherever he has felt that mere translation
would not satisfactorily transmit the content of Wenger's thought (princi-
pally where Wenger presupposes notions with which jurists of common la,
countries are not familiar) he has added explanatory notes which are not
only tributes to the excellence of his scholarship in both the civil and common
law but also make the book particularly useful as an introduction for the com-
mon law student into the civil law theories of procedure. An appendix adds
a translation of the Greek and Latin citations of the original. Here, too, Mr.
Fisk adds his own notes and thus avoids the dangers of over-literal or over-
free translation.
ROBERT NEUNERf
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE, INCLUDING EMtPLOYERS' LIABILITY
INSURANCE. Second Edition. By Clarence W. Hobbs. New York: Mc-
Graw-Hill Book Co., 1939. Pp. xviii, 707.
THIs volume is improperly termed a second edition. It was originally in-
tended as a new edition of the valuable work by Michelbacher and Nial on
Workmen's Compensation Insurance, published in 1925, but the lapse of
years made a new book necessary. The chief resemblance between the old
and the new is the high standard maintained in the new volume. The volume
is not a law book in the technical sense, although substantially half of its
pages are devoted to analysis of compensation statutes. The remaining
pages, which deal with insurance carriers and rate making, are likewise essen-
tial to a lawvyer's understanding of workmen's compensation.
As a result of his wide experience in administering a state insurance law
and his many years of service as representative of the National Association
of Insurance Commissioners on the National Council on Compensation In-
surance, the author is unusually qualified for the preparation of a book of
this character. The reviewer regrets that the limits of the volume did not per-
mit the author to make more extended use of his annual reports to the Na-
tional Association of Insurance Commissioners. These reports for the past
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ten years give an interesting picture of an industrial depression seen in terms
of compensation for industrial injuries. These annual reports also represent
a more informal and oftentimes a fuller discussion of many problems than
can be presented in a text book. It is perhaps proper that, in the present state
of its development, the multi-split experience rating plan should be merely
referred to in the book (p. 574), but, in order to understand the plan, the
reader needs the fuller discussion found in the author's annual report to the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners for 1939. The book con-
tains so much valuable information, however, that it cannot be unduly criti-
cized for being no longer than it is.
In view of the constant changes taking place in the statutes regulating work-
men's compensation, statements correct in page proof are often incorrect
when the book is issued. But the present volume presents a clear and accurate
picture of workmen's compensation as of January 1, 1939, and it is trusted
that the demand for the book will make revisions possible as frequently as
changes of conditions call for them.
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